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STATEMENT OF CASE
The Utah Supreme Court held on the original decision in this case that Worthen vs. Shu,rtleff and Andrews, 19 Utah P. 2d 223, should not be applied retro-
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actively to govern cases that occurred prior to the decision in Worthen. Respondents and amicus curiae have
petitioned for rehearing.

DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING
The Utah Supreme Court held that the decision in
Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, 19 Utah P. 2d 223,
should not be applied retroactively to govern cases that
occurred prior to the decision in Worthen.

STATE.MENT OF FACTS
The appellants agree with the statement of facts
contained in the original decision in this case and the
original brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO MERIT TO PETITIONERS' PRIMARY ARGUMENTS FOR REHEARING: i.e., THAT
THE INSTANT DECISION IS UNFAIR; ILLOGICAL; DISCRIMINATORY, ARBITRARY, AND UNJUST; DENIES THE RESPONDENTS E Q UAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW; AND DENIES THE
RESPONDENTS UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE

LAW.

3
The respondents and amicus curiae have urged many
"points" in their briefs for granting a rehearing. They
have argued primarily that the decision in the instant
case is: (1) unfair; (2) illogical; (3) discriminatory,
arbitrary and unjust; (4) denies the respondents equal
protection of the law; and ( 5) denies the respondents
uniform operation of the law. The theory underlying
all the points is the philosophy, first promulgated by
Socrates, that persons in equal situations should be
treated equally. They argue that the respondents in this
case are similarly situated to plaintiff Worthen in the
case of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrew, 19 Utah P. 2d
223. Thus, they urge that to apply different law to the
respondents would be unfair, illogical, discriminatory,
arbitrary and unjust; and it denies the respondents equal
protection and uniform operation of the law. In this
reply brief, appellant will treat all these points together
as the same rationale and law applies.
Inasmuch as none of these points was raised prior
to the petition for rehearing, the court should refuse to
consider them. See People v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 Pac.
638; Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 Pac. 716;

Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170 Pac. 744; Dahlquist
v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833; Pingree National Bank of Ogden v. Weber County, 54 Utah
599, 183 Pac. 334; Western Securities Co. v. Silver King
Cousd Min. Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664; e.g.; In re
Lowe's Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 Pac. 128.
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Although new points may not be urged for the first
time on rehearing, see cases cited, sitpra, respondent
is not content to rely on this general rule for denial of
rehearing but desires to go further and point out the
fallacy underlying petitioners' rationale.
Petitioners urge that the refusal to apply the
lVorthen case retroactively denies their constitutional
rights - the right to equal protection of the law and
the right to uniform oeration of the law. However, in the
same brief, petitioners cite Great Northern R. Co. v. The
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the retroactive
question does not raise a constitutional issue. See also
Tehan v. the U.S. ex, rel, Shott, 382 U.S. 406. Mr. Justice
Cardoza in the Sunburst case, supra, stated:
"This is a case where a court has refused to
make its ruling retroactive, and the novel stand is
taken that the constitution of the United States
is infringed by the refusal. vV e think the federal
constitution has no voice upon the subject. A
state is defining the limits of adherence to precec.
dent may make a choice for itself between the
principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest
court, though later overruled, are law none the
less for intermediate transactions. . . . As applied
to each transaction we may say of the earlier
decision that it has not been overruled at all, ...
that transactions arising in the future will be
governed by different rule. . . . The alternative
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is the same whether the subject of the decision is
common law or statute. The choice for any state
may be determined by the judicial philosophy of
judges of her courts....
Mr. Justice Cardoza's rationale was recently affirmed
in United States Supreme Court in the case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 wherein Mr.•Justice Clark
stated:
"We believe that the constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. . . .
[W] e are neither required to apply nor prohibited from applying decisions retroactively ...
we but apply the wisdom of Justice Homes - that
the life of the law has not been logic, it has been
experience."
The briefs urging rehearing, although short on authority are lengthy on argument and analogies, i.e., petitioners argue that the present decision makes the outcome
of a case depend upon "a race to the court house" or
upon some deputy clerk's "jockeying" the court calendar.
It is difficult, however, to see the applicability of petitioners' argument in view of the lengh of time - years
- they waited to present their claims in the instant case.
But petitioners argue that since they are in essentially
the same position as Worthen it is unfair, discriminatory,
arbitrary, and unjust to give different results to them
than to Worthen, just because ·worthen presented his
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claim first. However, this argument is a two-edged
sword. For example, the compensation carrier in the
Worthen case was in the identical situation as the State
Insurance Fund in McConnell v. Commission of Finance,
13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394. Under petitioners' rationale, Worthen must have been improperly decided as
it applied different law to two similarly situated insurance carriers and, thus, was discriminatory, unfair, arbitrary, etc. (See Mr. Justice Henroid's dissent in the
Worthen case.) The logical result of petitioners' rationale
is that there could never be overruling precedent inasmuch as every case overruling another case applies different law to the same facts. Following petitioners'
rationale further, since plaintiff McConnell in the 111c-

Connell case is in the same position as Worthen and the
respondents herein, he should now be allowed recovery.
Thus, petitioners' rationale not only prevents growth in
the law and the overruling of erroneous precedent, but
also does away with the doctrine of res judicata.
Although petitioners' rationale (persons in equal
situations should be treated equally) is emotionally
appealing, it is rather naive. It only looks to one interest
of the law; i.e., equity. However, the law has o,ther,
equally important interests. The law must grow; it must
meet the exigencies of the times; and must also overrule
erroneous decisions. While the law should attempt to
treat persons in equal positions equally, it must also be
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stable, predictable and final. As Rosco Pound stated:
"Law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still." Interpretations of Legal Histories, (1923) page 1. Sometimes
these important legal goals conflict, such as when precedent is overruled. The courts cannot allow the goal of
stability to prevent correction of erroneous precedent.
Yet, when precedent is overruled, courts cannot allow
the goal urged by petitioners, to disrupt justifiable expectations and relations entered into in reliance on the
earlier precedent. Thus it is necessary to compromise
the goals urged by petitioners with the goals of stability,
predictability, and finality. A proper manner in which
to balance these conflicting interests, as pointed out in
earlier brief and done by the Supreme Court in the
instant case is to reverse a case but refuse to apply the
new doctrine retroactively. This has been the suggested
procedure of Austin, Cardoza, Traynor and Bodenheimer.
It has been approved and even recommended by the
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court
in the instant case, and other state and federal courts.
(See authorities cited in brief on original hearing.)
POINT II
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS THAT THE INST ANT
CASE IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW OF LIMITED RETROACTIVITY ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

Petitioners urge that the Supreme Court erred m
the instant case in applying the rule against retroactive
effect of overruling precedent. They urge that the
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Worthen case, in effect, applied the law retroactively
since the facts in the Worthen case occurred prior to
the decision. Thus, they argue that the W orthcn decision
had, in effect, retroactive effect, and, therefore, the decision in Worthen must also be applied to them. If petitioners mean that the Supreme Court did not legislate
in Worthen, i.e., applied law to fact, not jm;t to govern
future situations, then they are correct. No doubt, each
case decided by a court is, in a sense, retroactive inasmuch as courts must decide cases on particular fact situations that occurred. However, such logic does not dictate
that the court must apply the new law to fact situations
that occurred prior to the decision. As pointed out in
earlier quotations from Mr. Justice Cardoza, the state
courts are at liberty to determine the prospective, retroactive or limited retroactive effect their decisions will
have. Again, he stated:
"A state in defining the limits of adherence
to precedent may make a choice for itself between
the principal of forward operation and that of
relation backward. Jt may say that decisions of
its highest court, though later overruled, are law
none the less for intermediate transactions. . . .
As applied to each transaction we may say of
the earlier decision that it has not been overruled
at all, ... that transactions arising in the future
will be governed by a different rule."
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Sunburst case, supra.
Some of respondents argue that the doctrine of limited retroactivity was improperly applied to them as the
facts in their cases occurred subsequent to the facts in
Worthen. However, that is unimportant as may be seen
from the quotation above. Moreover the cut-off usually
used by state court when applying the doctrine of limited
retroactivity is the date of the decision. If the facts in
the case occurred prior to the date of the overruling
decision then the old law is applicable. (See the cases
cited in the brief on the original appeal.) Similar cases
have arisen with respect to the retroactivity of decisions
doing away with governmental immunity. For example,
in Holytz v. lllilwaukee, 17 vVis. 2d 21, 115 N.vV. 2d 618
the \Visconsin Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
governmental imunimty from tort liability. However,
in Marshall v. Greenbay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W. 2d
715, the H olytz rule was not applied retroactively
although the Marshall case was pending in the lower
court on the date the H olytz case was decided. See also
Terry v. Mount Zion Community United School District,
30 Ill. app. 2d 307, 174 N.E. 2d 701.
The gist of the decisions in both the original brief
and this brief is that the state court may determine for
itself the amount of retroactive effect an overruling
precedent will have, and, thus, there is no mandatory
legal requirements Consequently, the instant decision
could not have erroneously applied the law. Moreover,
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the manner in which the court in the instant case limited the retroactive effect of Worthen is the general way
courts have done in the past, i.e., Worthen is controlling
on all cases with facts arising after the date of its decision and McConnell controls cases with facts occurring
prior to the Worthen case. Such limited retroactivity
protects justifiable expectations and the legal goals of
stability, predictability, and finality while allowing the
law to grow and correct erroneous decisions.
Respectfully submitted:

RICHARD J. LEEDY
Attorney at Law

